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Introduction
 
In this paper I would like to trace Japan’s economic development in early
 
years after the World War II and present some cases of private firms’
response.
The recorded high-growth of Japanese economy was neither a result
 
of the autonomous development process nor the consequence of the
 
Government’s carefully designed development program. Aside from
 
various kinds of luck,business leaders’foresighted decisions accompanied
 
with individual firm’s assiduous efforts made it possible.
The occupation authority did not intend to strengthen Japanese
 
economy when the Japanese Government was ordered to do the three
 
major reforms(zaibatsu dissolution,farm land reform and labor reform)
right after the war. Their aim was just to develop democracy in Japan
 
in order not to start a war again. However, those reforms not only
 
brought about developing democracy in Japan but also more stable social
 
and labor relations, and created more competitive conditions for the
 
business environment than before.
Without proper responses of private firms in this difficult time,
development path of postwar Japan might have changed. For instance,
new business leaders took chances in this change. They made bold
 
investment decisions against strong opposing views. President Nishi-
yama of Kawasaki Steel was a typical case of these new leaders. We
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must note that there existed a considerable number of top managers who
 
were confident about the prospects of Japan and their industries during
 
the turbulent economic conditions. Policies accompanied by private
 
firms’positive reactions paved a way for the high-growth of the economy
 
in the next period.
The first decade of 1945-55 after the war,therefore,can be regarded
 
as a period of forging a springboard for the high-growth era starting in
 
the mid 1950s.
I.An Overview of the First Decade of the Post-War
 
Japanese Economy
 
1.Economic Reforms as the Occupation Policy
 
As a consequence of the World War II defeat in August 1945,Japan was
 
occupied by the Allied Forces. In fact the United States alone took
 
leadership of the occupation policy in Japan. The Occupation Authority
 
began with democratization of Japanese social and economic systems to
 
deprive prewar ruling classes of their powers. The three economic
 
reforms among others were especially important. They were zaibatsu?
dissolution,the farm land reform and the labor relations reform.
In the pre-war period zaibatsu had been influential in the economy.
As of September 1945 when the occupation policy of Japan including
 
dissolution of zaibatsu was announced?, total paid-in capital of big four
 
zaibatsu accounted for 24.5 percent of total capital of all companies in
 
Japan?. Production and shipment shares of them must have been more
 
than the capital share.
佐賀大学経済論集 第40巻第１号
１ A Japanese word referring to big family business concerns of prewar Japan
２ “The U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan”was announced on 22
 
September,1945 by the U.S. State Department.
３ Arisawa(1995),Nihon Shoukenshi (Securities History of Japan)〔2〕p.224
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In August 1946 five zaibatsu holding companies?were designated to be
 
dissolved. Other zaibatsu families were later added to the list for dissolu-
tion. Not only dissolution of holding companies but also designated
 
influential companies such as Mitsui & Co. and Mitsubishi Corp. in
 
trading businesses and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in the manufacturing
 
industry were to be split into separate companies. Top management of
 
major zaibatsu related corporations were purged from their posts.?
The farm land reform was pursued from December 1945 to 1949 by
 
GHQ(General Headquarters). The plan was initiated by some bureau-
crats of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in the Japanese Govern-
ment in 1945 but later GHQ pushed a more drastic plan of farm land
 
reforms. As a consequence,large land owners lost their powers and each
 
peasant who had not had his/her own farm land could become a farmer
 
holding a small farming lot. The farm land reform contributed to
 
stabilizing social movements and improving economic welfare of agricul-
tural areas which had been long-awaited goals in prewar days.
Thirdly the labor related reform was made. By this reform organiz-
ing labor unions became legal for the first time in Japanese history and
 
the criteria of labor work such as the minimum level of wage was set.
The reform made solid foundations for developing the Japanese style
 
management.
2.Damage by the War
 
The damage to the physical assets by the war was tremendous. It was
 
estimated that the national wealth of Japan at the end of WWII in 1945
 
had lost about 35 percent compared with that of 1944. The value of the
４ In addition to the“Big Four”of Mitsui,Mitsubishi,Sumitomo and Yasuda,Fuji
 
Industries(Nakajima Airplane)was included.
５ For instance, Konosuke Matsushita, founder of Matsushita Electric Industries,
was purged as a zaibatsu leader but later his name was taken off the list.
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lost national wealth was almost equal to the amount of GNP in the year
 
of 1946. Number of lost and damaged houses accounted for 2.2 million. 14
 
million houses that existed in prewar days decreased to 11.35 millions,
which was about a 20 percent decrease and resulted in a situation of 9
 
million people without houses to live in. As to human lives,2.6 million
 
were lost.
Damage to the production facilities caused serious bottleneck prob-
lems for the industrial production. As seen in Table 2 industrial produc-
tion level declined to about 30% of the 1934-36 level. GNP declined to
 
about 60 percent of prewar level in 1946 and 1947.
Table 1 Estimated Loss of National Wealth (As of the End of War)
National Wealth
 
Note:?Difference from the value of 1944.
Source:Tatsuro Uchino(1978)
Total National Wealth
 
National Wealth (nonmilitary sectors)
Houses(number of units)
Ships excluding military use(tons) 81％
20％
25.4％?
35％?
Lost Ratio
 
Coal Production
 
Steel Production
109105000NA
373160
5655NA
6562NA
194719461945
715378
151024
767960
113109104
48201630350Wholesale Price Index
 
Population
 
Agricultural Production
 
Table 2Production Levels and Inflation after the War(1934～36＝100)
Source;same as Table 1
 
Real GNP
 
Real GNP per Capita
 
Industrial Production
 
Consumer Price Index
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3． Starvation and“Bamboo Shoot Life”
The word “bamboo shoot life”became popular in Japan among the
 
general public during the period immediately after World War II. As if
 
to peel bamboo shoots,people exchanged their clothes for rice or vegeta-
bles to survive in the days of severe shortage of foodstuffs.
Like sprouting buds in spring,black markets appeared in every town.
They sold foodstuffs, clothes, blankets, electric heaters, kitchen wares
 
like pans, and so on. Metal stocks for military uses were taken out
 
legally or illegally and used as materials for products like kitchen uten-
sils.
What made it more difficult for the living of people at that time was
 
the fact that millions of people returned home to Japan from overseas?.
They lost jobs so that in many cases they went to relatives’homes of
 
farmers to work with them. In later days when coal mining became a
 
priority industry many jobless workers including those returnees were
 
absorbed as miners.
Furthermore,Japan experienced an unusually bad crop of rice due to
 
lack of fertilizer and unfavorable weather such as typhoons in 1945. The
 
rice crop yield of 1945 dropped to 60 percent of average production level.
It was believed that millions of people were going to die of hunger in 1946.
The Japanese Government asked for 4.6 million tons of foodstuffs as
 
emergency aid from the U.S. in 1945,but no food arrived within the year.
In 1946 only 0.7 million tons of foodstuffs was imported. Shortage of
 
foodstuffs continued to be in serious condition,although an unprecedented
 
scale of starvation did not occur fortunately.? Following is a passage
 
depicting the life of Japan in those days.
６ It was estimated that returnees accounted for about 6 million right after the war.
７ MacArthur accused Prime Minister Yoshida of unreliable figures of agricultural
 
statistics,which became an occasion for accelerating the improvement of statistics
 
in Japan.(Uchino,p.54)
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People living in the big cities were forced to buy on the black market
 
and barter their personal possessions in order to survive. In October
 
1945 Japanese officials asked for more than 4 million tons of food from
 
the United States. SCAP?challenged Japanese statistics, and Yoshida
 
ruefully admitted to MacArthur that the data given him by his experts
 
were bad,adding that poor statistics were one reason Japan had lost the
 
war.〔Finn,Richard B.(1992,Chapter4,p.51)〕
An episode illustrates the situation. Judge Yamaguchi aged 34 of the
 
Tokyo Court in the field of economic control died of hunger in October
 
1947 because he strictly controlled himself and his family not to purchase
 
rice from a black market?. He took only the officially allocated rice and
 
let his two sons take most of it. Since he had to judge cases of violating
 
economic control laws,he could not violate the law himself even though
 
he knew about his inadequate nutrition condition. The officially allocated
 
rice was too little to live in a normal condition for an average person.
4. Rapid Inflation
 
Rampant inflation prevailed since the war ended. Inflation together with
 
shortage of foodstuffs made the income of Japanese families unduly
 
re-distributed from those who relied on past saving of money to farmers.
The black market price index of February 1946 increased double compar-
ed to that of September 1945.
The fundamental cause of inflation right after the war was a big gap
 
between the amount of goods and that of money. During the wartime
 
most of the funds raised by the Government bond issuance and borrow-
ings from the Bank of Japan were used for unproductive military expendi-
tures,which became potential inflationary factors. But until the war’s
８ the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
９ Reported in the Asahi Shimbun,November 4,1947.
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end Government price control was so strong that inflation was not
 
realized. When the war ended returned soldiers from overseas were paid
 
as compensation for their past services and bills payable for military
 
products were cashed in a very short period. Money was circulated
 
increasingly but manufacturing equipments were damaged and materials
 
were in short supply. Therefore, while people had purchasing power,
supplying capability of consumer goods was too low to meet demand.
For the purpose of altering businesses of firms which had produced
 
military-use products into nonmilitary businesses, banks lent money to
 
firms for their working capital use. Working capital of those firms was
 
increasingly needed as material prices and wages were increasing. In
 
addition people began to draw cash from their deposit accounts in order
 
to avoid the property tax which was believed to be introduced soon by
 
rumor. In this way the vicious circle of inflation and increasing money
 
started in a very strong and accelerated manner.
On February 16,1946 the Economic Emergency Policy was announced
 
to freeze bank deposits and became effective from March 3 of the year.
The yen previously used was called“old yen”. Old yen could not be used
 
after March 2 and people were urged to deposit old yen until March 7.
The maximum amount of yen that could be drawn was 300 yen for a
 
house holder and 100 yen for each family member in a month. The limit
 
of new yen payment for a monthly salary was 500 yen per person. If the
 
salary exceeded 500 yen, the amount over 500 yen was paid by old yen
 
deposit. The economic emergency measures yielded favorable results for
 
slowing down inflation rates,but only temporarily.
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5.Priority Production Policy
 
GHQ was unsatisfied by the economic performance of Japanese Govern-
ment policies. It suggested the Government create a new organization to
 
promote economic policies. Accordingly the Economic Stabilization
 
Board was established in August,1946.
Urgently needed was expanding production capabilities. The prob-
lem was bottlenecks impeding increase of production. In order to
 
increase production of rice crops and other foodstuffs,it was necessary to
 
increase supply of chemical fertilizer. But production facilities of chemi-
cal fertilizer needed to be repaired. Machines and equipments to repair
 
damaged facilities were also scarce. Because of steel shortage,they could
 
not make machines and equipment to repair production facilities. In
 
order to increase steel production,more coal production was necessary.
Also the railway transportation to distribute materials and products did
 
not work because of shortage of coal to operate locomotives. In order to
 
produce coal, equipments to dig coal mines were necessary, and those
 
equipments were made of steel which was in short supply. Therefore
 
every route for the increase of production seemed to hit an impasse.
Source:Data from Iida et al.(1976 vol.1,p.62,p.65)
Figure 1Production and Retail Price(1935-52)
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In December 1946, “the Priority Production Policy”was officially
 
approved by the Cabinet. Before that time the policy had been proposed
 
to Prime Minister Yoshida by Professor Hiromi Arisawa of Tokyo
 
University. The Economic Stabilization Board was responsible for im-
plementing and promoting the policy. In this policy all available
 
resources were going to be used to increase production of coal and steel.
In order to make this measure successful the Japanese Government
 
asked for importing heavy oil from the U.S. Government. The imported
 
heavy oil filled the gap of the insufficient amount of coal. Coal and heavy
 
oil were used to produce steel,and newly produced steel was used to make
 
equipments for coal production. The produced coal was in turn used for
 
the production of steel. As fringe benefits for coal mine workers,rice and
 
clothes were officially allocated more than to others and low cost housing
 
was secured. Therefore even university graduates who were esteemed by
 
the general public in those days joined this work to live in a starving life??.
In this way production levels of coal and steel gradually increased.
The Priority Production Policy is regarded as a successful policy.
The success could be attributable to the matched policy of financing
 
operation for the designated priority industries.
When the Economic Stabilization Board was established in August,
1946, the economy was getting worse. The worsened situation derived
 
mainly from the fact that GHQ ordered stopping paying military related
 
past debt. As an increasing number of bankruptcy cases of corporations
 
were concerned due to this GHQ order,the Japanese Government tried to
 
prevent such a situation by financial measures. For this purpose“Recon-
struction Finance”for corporations by the Industrial Bank of Japan
 
started,and the unit of the bank was reorganized later to be a separate
10 Shimokawa (1990, p.62). University graduates gained this job without telling
 
their educational background. Shimokawa worked as mine worker himself and
 
sometimes learned English words within the mine from one of them.
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Government organization, “the Reconstruction Finance Corporation”
(RFC)in early 1947.
This measure of financing kept the economy back from further
 
worsening and helped production of such industries as coal mining and
 
steel manufacturing in line with the Priority Production Policy. On the
 
other hand financing through the RFC reheated the inflationary situation
 
which was once calmed down by stopping old yen in circulation. This is
 
because the Government was solely dependent on the Bank of Japan
(BOJ)for the financial sources of loans provided by the RFC. The money
 
for RFC loans was procured by issuing bonds which were held by the BOJ.
For any firm provided with a long-term loan could count on gains from
 
depreciated value of the borrowed money under a rapid inflationary
 
situation,so that firms in the priority industries competed to get the RFC
 
loans. Other long-term loans from private banks were not available in
 
those days.
In order to provide basic materials at lower cost to avoid price
 
increase of other products,the Government set official producer prices of
 
basic materials. The Government subsidized the difference of official
 
producer price and production cost. For instance,the cost of coal was 613
 
yen per ton while the producer price was 346 yen per ton in March,1947??
In this case the deficit of coal production per ton was 267 yen or 43
 
percent of the production cost and was compensated by subsidies.
Subsidies for adjusting the difference of prices were made for such basic
 
products as coal, steel, foodstuffs, and fertilizer, which contributed as
 
other incentives for the production increase. Naturally,subsidies became
 
a big burden for the Japanese Government as the expenditures for the
 
subsidies increased. The expenditure made the deficit of Government
 
budget much bigger. Again,it was financed by the credit of the Bank of
 
Japan.
11 The First Economic White Paper(1947).
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6.A Drastic Deflationary Policy??“Dodge Line”
Economic aid to Japan by the U.S. Government continued and it became
 
a significant burden. As the U.S. Government was concerned with the
 
Japanese economy,Joseph Dodge,Chairman of Detroit Bank,was sent to
 
Japan as economic advisor for the Japanese Government in February
 
1949.
Dodge stated a simple and clear message to Japanese journalists.
“Japan’s economy is walking on stilts made of price subsidies and U.S.
commodity assistance. These have to be cut, or Japan will fall on its
 
face”??. His metaphor of“stilts”was easily understood by Japanese and
 
the words, “stilt economy”became popular among Japanese of those
 
days. True to his words he made the Japanese Government cut both. He
 
wrote a recipe for a balanced budget for the fiscal 1949. Although the
 
expenditure for the fiscal year increased by 57 percent because of infla-
tion, the budget was called an “over-balanced budget”as it made a
 
surplus of 156.9 billion yen which was used for the repayment of the debt.
As a result,expanded money supply turned to a contraction and prices
 
were leveling off. The Tokyo retail price index which had increased
 
nearly three times in 1948 slowed down to a 63 percent increase in 1949
12 Asahi Shimbun,March 8,1949,“Dodge’s Statement on 9 Principles”
266Mar.
Dec.
Nov.
1946Oct.
Source:Daiichiji Keizai Hakusho (The First Economic White Paper,1947)
Table 3 Cost and Deficits of Coal Mining Industries (Yen/Ton)
1947 Jan.
Feb. 540 346 194
476 346 130
Production Cost of Coal  
Official Producer Price  Deficits per Ton
389 220 169
392 346 46
433 346 87
613 346
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and recorded a small decline in 1950(see Table 4).The austerity program
 
which was well represented by the balanced budget was called “Dodge
 
Line”after the confident U.S.banker’s name.
At the same time the fixed exchange rate of yen to the U.S. dollar
 
was set to be 360 yen in April, 1949. The new exchange rate caused
 
unfavorable consequences for both exporting and importing companies by
 
either decreased revenues or increased cost, because various exchange
 
rates ranging from 180 yen to 600 yen to the dollar had been applied for
 
imported and exported products before the unification of the exchange
 
rates. For instance 600 yen was applied as the exchange rate for
 
ceramics,500 yen for binoculars and 420 yen for silk made products.
The Dodge Line was such a drastic deflationary policy that the
 
number of bankruptcy cases increased remarkably from the mid of 1949.
Even Toyota Motor Co. which is now regarded as a leading company in
 
Japan and one of the most competitive car manufacturing companies in
 
the world was on the brink of bankruptcy around the end of 1949 to early
 
1950. Toyota was saved by Mr.Takanashi,Chief of the Nagoya Branch
 
Office of the Bank of Japan. He asked city banks and regional banks in
 
Nagoya City and its surrounding areas for their help avoiding Toyota’s
 
bankruptcy, because the company’s bankruptcy would cause a widely
 
spreading damage in the regional economy. Thanks to the syndicated
 
emergency loan of these banks, Toyota could survive in this crucial
 
period.
Coal mines were no exception to the deflationary policy effects in this
 
period. Purchase of new equipments for the efficient production of coal
 
Table 4Tokyo Retail Price Index (1934～36＝1)
Index
 
Increase%
Source: Iida,et al.(1976)
1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950
3.08 18.93 50.99 149.6 243.4 239.1
46.8 514.6 169.4 193.4 62.7 -1.8
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stopped. A large number of Government officials and employees of
 
private companies were fired including 100 thousands of employees
 
working for the Japan National Railway,causing intensifying frictions
 
between the management and radical labor unions of JNR. The economy
 
was really in a serious recession and a deflationary spiral was developing.
7.Breakout of the Korean War
 
In the midst of the serious recession,an unforeseen incident which altered
 
the path of the post-war economy occurred. On 25 of June, 1950, the
 
Korean War suddenly broke out. The war revived the Japanese economy
 
which had gone into a tailspin after the Dodge Line.
The economic boom derived firstly from a large quantity of special
 
procurement of the U.S. and secondly from the expansion of exports. It
 
was the largest boom in terms of relative scale of the economy since the
 
end of WWII. During the three years of the war orders of 1 billion dollars
 
worth of special procurement including services such as repairing trucks
 
were received in Japan. Exports increased by 55 percent in terms of the
1954
1953
Table 5 Balance of Payments ($million)
Source:Kosai,Y (1981,p.103)
1946
1951
1952
1955
1948
1947
1949
1950 924 886 38 361 149
536 728 -198 534 --
184 449 -266 404 --
265 547 -282 461 --
2,001 2,060 -53 -- 557
1,295 1,701 -407 5 824
1,358 1,645 -287 157 592
67 303 -236 192 --
Exports  Imports  Trade Balance  Aid  Special Procurement
1,261 2,050 -790 -- 809
1,614 2,041 -426 -- 596
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dollar amount and 35 percent in terms of volume in the second half of 1950
 
compared with the first half of the year. In addition consumption by
 
American soldiers during the stay in Japan accounted for more than the
 
amount of special procurement.??
The Korean War provided opportunities to accumulate capital for
 
corporations. But still higher costs of basic materials such as coal and
 
steels remained as a crucial problem of Japanese industries.
8.An Era of Struggling for Economic Independence
 
The first decade of the postwar Japanese economy was an era of strug-
gling and fumbling for economic independence. Problems arising for
 
policy makers were such as starvation, unemployment, hyper-inflation,
deflation,shortage of materials,shortage of capital,and so on. Apparent-
ly turbulent waves of economy seemed to be the characteristic feature of
 
the decade.
Yet if we look back to the period, it can be said that this decade
 
paved a way for the high-growth period starting from 1955. In other
 
words, the decade was a period of building a grand springboard to the
 
next period of high growth economy.
For instance,a series of measures such as economic reforms and the
 
Dodge line which were imposed by the Occupation Authority turned out
 
to be contributing factors to better economic performance as follows:
⑴ Dissolution of zaibatsu yielded more competitive situations for in-
dependent companies. The purge of top managers from major zaibatsu
 
related firms made the younger generation promoted to top manage-
ment,which could be a factor in the aggressive investment in the latter
 
half of the 1950s.
⑵ Farm land reform contributed to the social stability and economic
 
welfare in agricultural areas.
13 Uchino(1978)
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⑶ Labor reform brought about better income distributions for the labor
 
force and moreover, so called “corporate labor unions”helped in
 
developing Japanese-style management.
⑷Under the“Dodge Line”the Government was forced to stop subsidies
 
and make a budget without deficit financing,as well as establishing the
 
unified fixed exchange rate of 360 yen to the U.S. dollar. This policy
 
caused a serious deflation,but through the difficulty surviving corpo-
rations could enhance competitiveness. If Japan had faced the Korean
 
War without experiencing the Dodge Line,it would have had a serious
 
hyper-inflationary situation. To correct such an economy would have
 
called for much further difficult measures.
In short,the outside impact of major economic reforms and policies
 
in the period from 1945 to 1955 turned out to be strengthening factors
 
for the development of the Japanese economy.
However, policies alone could not lead the economy into a good
 
performance. Private sectors’response with their adaptability to policy
 
directions and new situations was needed. In the following sections
 
some cases will be illustrated to show this fact.
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II. Private Sector’s Response in the First Decade of
 
Postwar Japan
（Case 1）Binocular Manufacturers
??Network development of small manufacturers as an exporting
 
industry??
Binocular manufacturers were developed under the fostering policy of the
 
Army and the Navy in the pre-WWII days.
Tokyo Kogaku Kikai,(Tokyo Optical Company)which made binoc-
ulars at the Japanese Army’s request??lost demand after the War.
Thousands of employees lost jobs but spontaneously they came back to
 
live around the headquarters of the company located in Itabashi Ward in
 
the northern part of Tokyo. Some of them started businesses making
 
binoculars and sold their products to the Post Exchanges (PXs)of the
 
Occupation Forces. U.S. soldiers were glad to bring those binoculars
 
back home as souvenirs.
In the geographical area self-employed engineers made networks of
 
technologies and for each network the leadership was taken by an
“arranger”who took orders and asked each component maker to process
 
orders within a due date. In the network lens makers,prism makers,body
 
makers,and case makers were arranged and final products were made by
 
assembling components by the arranger. If a product did not focus
 
correctly,the arranger looked at a lightning rod of a tall chimney out of
 
the house with the binocular and corrected its focus by some delicate
 
changes of the body,lenses or prisms.
14 Nippon Kogaku (Nikon Corp.) located in the southern part of Tokyo started
 
binocular manufacturing at the request of the Japanese Navy after the breakout of
 
WWI. Tokyo Optical Company followed the Nippon Kogaku to make lenses and
 
binoculars in the 1930s.
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Binoculars became export products. Exporting binoculars was prof-
itable as the exchange rate for binoculars had been 500 yen before the
 
rates were unified to 360 yen to the U.S. dollar in 1949. Moreover export
 
bills were instantly cashed by banks so that those exporters could get
 
cash upon sales,which was important in rapid inflationary days.
It was natural that once a business was known to be profitable,
people including those without specialized knowledge of the business
 
rushed into the market. Some of them were immoral by exporting low
 
quality products with defects. There were cases in which stones were
 
placed inside of binocular bodies instead of prisms.
There were some associations of binocular manufacturers in Tokyo
 
and the Government (MITI)let those associations inspect products and
 
made a law to prohibit designated products including binoculars from
 
being exported without passing the inspection. In this way the Govern-
ment supported exporting businesses to secure the quality of products for
 
small and medium enterprises.
Source:Data from Kikaishinkokyokai Keizaikenkyusho (1978)b
 
Figure 2
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This case of small binocular manufacturers shows that small manu-
factures could organize informal networks themselves without large
 
firms’directions in the midst of a chaotic situation right after the war.
They responded to the situation of demand loss and could find a new
 
market for exporting their products. Further development of the industry
 
became possible by the Government support for inspection of their
 
products.
(Case 2)High-Precision Machine Tool Industry
??Mr.Makino’s Patient Efforts??
Companies in the machine tool industry had especially hard times after
 
the war. As a core of machine industries,machine tool manufacturing
 
companies lost almost one hundred percent of their demand for military
 
use. Thousands of unused stock of machine tools hampered recovery of
 
the industry. Many small and medium sized companies gave up continu-
ing operations in the industry.
In this period President Tsunezo Makino of Makino Milling Machine
 
Co.,Ltd. purchased many quality machines made in Western countries at
 
very low costs. They were left unused as dead stocks of various
 
manufacturing companies. Other companies were glad to sell unused
 
machines since they could not expect any demands for those machines in
 
the foreseeable future. Also he hired skilled engineers of other machine
 
tool manufacturing companies partly because those companies needed to
 
cut employees and the management of them asked him to hire their
 
skilled engineers in order to keep those engineers in the same industry.
Mr.Makino let engineers study purchased quality machines and brought
 
their skills up.
During the period revenues of Makino’s company depended on repair-
ing works of machines used in agricultural and fishery operations,
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although the work did not require skilled technology it helped the com-
pany survive in the tough period. This demand increased because
 
farmers’income improved as a result of the land reform and a shortage
 
of foodstuffs. Another reason why Makino’s company could survive was
 
that the company had technological capabilities for smaller scale milling
 
machines which could be used for the camera industry. The camera
 
industry was one of the emerging industries in the early postwar period
 
and its manufacturing process required precision machine tools.
Thanks to those efforts accumulated in a difficult period,Makino’s
 
company could meet sudden huge demand for quality machine tools from
 
overseas when the Korean War broke out. Other companies had diffi-
culty meeting such demand because either their capacities or quality
 
levels fell short of the orders’requirement.
Mr.Makino’s strong will to adhere to the high precision machine tool
 
business in the midst of the pessimistic environment helped to upgrade
 
Japanese machine tool industry in later years. The quality machine tools
 
of the Japan supported development of the manufacturing industries in
 
general in a high economic growth era.
As foreign exchange reserves continued to be constraints of economic
 
growth until mid 1960s, substituting high precision machine tools from
 
overseas with domestic machines was certainly not an ignorable contribu-
tion for the spillover of technology in the manufacturing sector.
(Case 3)Modernization Investment of the Steel Industry
??President Nishiyama’s Bold Decision??
It was 1949 when Mr.Yataro Nishiyama,director in charge of the steel
 
production unit of Kawasaki Heavy Industries made his members of staff
 
find a land space suitable to build a modernized iron and steel production
 
factory. In 1950 the plan was announced. The unit was split to become
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the Kawasaki Steel Co.,Ltd. in the year 1950 and he became the first
 
president of the company. He decided a seashore space of Chiba Prefec-
ture in the east of Tokyo as the best place for the planned factory. As his
 
bold plan was revealed,it was criticized as being crazy and unrealistic by
 
media and bureaucrats,not to mention competitors.
The investment plan needed 16.3 billion yen while the capital of the
 
company was only 0.5 billion yen initially. President of the Bank of Japan
 
Ichimada was said to have said,”Weeds shall grow in the yard of the
 
Chiba Factory”. His words typified how strongly he opposed the plan.
He tried to persuade officials of the Ministry of International trade
 
and Industry(MITI)and was successful in getting half of the necessary
 
funds from the Governmental long term loan program under the control
 
of the MITI. The Rest of the funds came from the newly established
 
Development Bank of Japan,Dai-Ichi Bank and stock and bond issues.
The project completed in 1953 as the first phase of rationalization
 
investment and proved to be successful as Kawasaki produced iron and
 
steel products at very competitive prices. The project which was carried
 
out by heavily leveraged financing ignited the animal spirits of corporate
 
leaders in various manufacturing industries. Thereafter they did not
 
hesitate to take risks of large scale investment projects with a small
 
portion of their own funds. Mr.Nishiyama ushered business leaders in an
 
era of investment boom of 1950s. For instance,Toray’s purchase of a
 
royalty for nylon production from Dupont at the cost of 1.08 billion yen
 
in 1951 can be counted as another example of the bold decisions of those
 
days. The royalty cost was more than the company’s capital of 0.75
 
billion yen.
Mr.Nishiyama could do it because he gained a free hand with his
 
decision as Kawasaki Steel had become independent and was not within
 
the organization of the former Kawasaki Heavy Industries. Dissolution
 
of zaibatsu holding companies and GHQ’s order of splitting designated
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large corporations made corporate leaders more aggressive than before.
Conclusions
 
The first decade after the war was a period of forging a springboard for
 
the later years of high growth economy.
The outside impact of economic reforms such as dissolution of
 
zaibatsu corporate groups and farm land reform resulted in better perfor-
mance of the economy. But policies alone could not yield better results.
Efforts of private firms to adapt to changing situations was needed. In
 
this sense,Mr.Makino and Mr.Nishiyama represent two good examples
 
of the entrepreneurship in that decade.
Also thousands of nameless small manufacturers responded with
 
dynamic activities in the chaotic situation. The case of binocular
 
manufacturers shows a process of structuring spontaneous networking of
 
technologies right after the war.
Without those entrepreneurs and dynamic small manufacturers the
 
path of the Japanese economy in later years could have been changed to
 
some extent.
（本稿は2007年３月に筆者が北京工業大学経済管理学院において行った講義
録をもとに加筆修正したものである）
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